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CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME 
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HARDCOVER $29.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern history of the death penalty in America begins with the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.1 There, the Court, in a five to four decision, held 
the death penalty, as then administered, violated the Eighth Amendment. Prior to the 
Furman decision, although forty-one states had death penalty statutes on the books, the 
use of, and support for, the death penalty had been in decline for a number of years.2 
However, the decision seemed to spark renewed enthusiasm for the death penalty. By 
1976, when the Court considered the constitutionality of death penalty statutes enacted to 
meet the Court’s Furman concerns, thirty-five states had reenacted death penalty statutes.3 
In subsequent years, death sentences rose, to a high of 315 in 1996,4 and executions 
followed, reaching a high of ninety-eight in 1999.5 More recently, that picture has changed 
dramatically. Since 2000, seven states have abandoned the death penalty.6 Popular support 
for the death penalty, as measured by opinion polls, is now at its lowest point in the post-
                                                          
      *   Professor Emeritus, University of San Francisco School of Law. A.B., 1966, University of California, 
Berkeley; J.D., 1969, Harvard Law School.   
 1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 2. Id. at 291–93 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 4. Death Sentences by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (“DPIC”), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-present. 
 5. Execution Database, DPIC, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions. 
 6. Death Sentences by State and Year, supra note 4. 
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Furman era.7 In 2016, there were only thirty death sentences in the country and twenty 
executions.8 Underlying these figures are two facts central to an understanding of the 
modern death penalty. First, the death penalty is a regional phenomenon. The eleven 
former Confederate states plus Oklahoma (a “Confederate territory” during the Civil War) 
all are death penalty states and together account for eighty percent of the executions in the 
modern era.9 Second, the death penalty is differentially applied according to race. 
Numerous empirical studies of the death penalty, the most well-known being the Georgia 
study by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues used to challenge the death sentence 
in McCleskey v. Kemp,10 have found state-wide or county-wide racial disparities in death-
charging and death-sentencing.11 
Both of the books under review describe, and seek to explain, this history, although 
from very different perspectives. In Executing Freedom: The Cultural Life of Capital 
Punishment in the United States, Professor Daniel LaChance, a social and cultural 
historian who writes about punishment and popular culture,12 seeks to explain the cultural 
factors supporting the death penalty and the reasons for the increased support post-
Furman.13 In Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, Carol and 
Jordan Steiker, law professors who have been writing about the death penalty for more 
than two decades,14 analyze and criticize the Supreme Court’s treatment of the death 
penalty over the last half century.15 The books are complementary because the cultural 
and legal histories of the modern death penalty are interrelated, as the authors of both 
books acknowledge. Thus, LaChance’s discussion of cultural history includes a review of 
the three critical Supreme Court cases during the period—Furman v. Georgia16 (holding 
the death penalty unconstitutional), Gregg v. Georgia17 (upholding various revised death 
penalty statutes), and McCleskey v. Kemp18 (upholding Georgia’s death penalty scheme 
despite evidence that it operated in a racially discriminatory manner)—as well as several 
other Supreme Court decisions. For their part, the Steikers, in describing the history of the 
                                                          
 7. Baxter Oliphant, Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More Than Four Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29/support-for-death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-
four-decades. See also Emily Williams et al., Americans Are Turning Against the Death Penalty: Are Politicians 
Far Behind?, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/12/07/americans-are-turning-against-the-death-penalty-are-politicians-far-behind. 
 8. DPIC, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2016 (2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf. 
 9. Execution Database, supra note 5.   
 10. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 11. See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, 
and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1246–51 (2013) (discussing studies). 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel LaChance, Rehabilitating Violence: White Masculinity and Harsh Punishment in 1990s 
Popular Culture, in PUNISHMENT IN POPULAR CULTURE 163–96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 
2015). 
 13. DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2016) [hereinafter EXECUTING FREEDOM]. 
 14. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995). 
 15. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (2016) [hereinafter COURTING DEATH]. 
 16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 18. 481 U.S. 279 (1981). 
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death penalty in America, emphasize that the death penalty was an expression of “vigilante 
values”19 (a point made by LaChance, as well) and identify the death penalty as a product 
of distinctively American “cultural commitments” to populism, localism, anti-statism, 
individuality, and religiosity.20 Both books contain more useful insights than can be 
mentioned in this review, and reading both books tells you all you need to know about the 
modern death penalty in America. 
I. CULTURAL VALUES AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
LaChance begins his argument with the proposition that, during the last half of the 
twentieth century, support for the death penalty varied inversely with the majority’s trust 
in the federal government.21 In the aftermath of World War II, White, middle-class men 
were the beneficiaries of the federal government’s welfare programs, which encouraged 
“positive” freedom (i.e., autonomy and the ability to pursue one’s self-interest).22 In the 
late 1960s, however, trust in the federal government fell because the beneficiaries of the 
government’s welfare programs were increasingly non-White and/or poor Americans, 
crime rates were rising and the criminal justice system was seen to be failing because of 
the Supreme Court’s excessive concern with protecting the rights of defendants.23 White 
middle class Americans became more concerned with “negative” freedom, protection from 
harm, and that concern fueled renewed support for the death penalty and other harsh 
punishments.24 Retribution became the dominant penological goal. Citing the writings of 
professor and death penalty supporter Walter Berns, LaChance argues that the death 
penalty was seen as an antidote to the nihilism of modern life: “A nation that executes . . . 
‘will remind its citizens that it is a country worthy of heroes.’”25 
The strength of Executing Freedom is in its identification of the disparate strands of 
the death penalty culture that fostered its post-Furman revival. LaChance describes the 
ideology of the death penalty supporters as “a mixture of the frontier libertarianism . . . 
with the civilizing virtues of family—‘family values libertarianism.’”26 By “frontier 
libertarianism,” he means the libertarian distrust of the criminal justice system, including 
judges, parole boards, and governors. The death penalty and other harsh punishments were 
seen as a corrective for a legal and technocratic culture unwilling to exact retribution for 
horrible crimes.27 LaChance argues that support for the death penalty also came from 
“family values” conservatives, who conceived of crime as a product of a culture that 
encouraged immoral behavior and prevented families from effectively transmitting moral 
values to their children.28 The death penalty was a rebuke to the paternalistic state that had 
                                                          
 19. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 24. 
 20. Id. at 73. 
 21. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
 22. Id. at 7. 
 23. Id. at 10–11. 
 24. Id. at 9–12. 
 25. Id. at 44 (quoting WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 176 (1979)). 
 26. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 156. 
 27. Id. at 148–49. 
 28. Id. at 158–59. 
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displaced the family as the moral locus of society and thereby undercut the role of the 
father within the family.29 According to LaChance, it was this concern to reemphasize 
family values that led to the victims’ rights movement and established the right of the 
victims’ families to offer victim impact evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial.30 
Support for the death penalty also had a religious dimension. “Christianity has long-shaped 
the meaning of the death penalty in American society.”31 Executions provided the 
occasion for a drama of moral reckoning, with the defendant forced to confront the 
enormity of his crime and the victim’s family present to witness the triumph of good over 
evil. In this context, LaChance refers to the film Dead Man Walking as a “sympathetic 
portrayal of the death penalty.”32 Although, at first, this seems like an odd statement 
because Sister Helen Prejean, the author of the book, and Tim Robbins, the director of the 
movie, are outspoken opponents of capital punishment, in fact, many have seen the movie 
as LaChance does: the condemned man confronting his impending execution, by taking 
responsibility for his crimes, attains a sense of grace. Underlying all is a belief in the need 
for righteous violence. The execution of a murderer is not viewed as a necessary evil, to 
rid society of a poisonous presence, but as a positive virtue. As LaChance puts it, the death 
penalty represents “the possibility that feudal virtues—masculine honor, radical 
independence, patriarchal clannishness, raw physical strength—could still flourish in a 
technologically advanced, civilized world.”33 
As LaChance explains, the modern death penalty represents an uneasy compromise 
with that instinct for righteous violence.34 Nowhere is that compromise more evident than 
in the struggle over lethal injection. The rise in support for the death penalty coincided 
with a rejection of the rehabilitative (medical) model of punishment and the prison 
bureaucracy that implemented it. The death penalty was the antithesis of the rehabilitative 
model—it was retribution, pure and simple.35 However, in an effort to distinguish the 
death penalty from lynchings—where the victims were usually tortured before being killed 
and their bodies often mutilated afterward—executions were to be as painless as possible. 
So began a search for a “humane” execution method that, forty years ago, settled on lethal 
injection. Whether, in fact, lethal injection is a humane execution method is far from clear 
because it has produced a higher percentage of botched executions than any other 
execution method.36 But, humane or not, lethal injection is seen by death penalty 
proponents as a bureaucratic quasi-medical procedure on a docile subject that completely 
                                                          
 29. Id. at 156. 
 30. Id. at 159–63. 
 31. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 23. 
 32. Id. at 19. 
 33. Id. at 133. LaChance is not alone in seeing the connection between the death penalty and feudal values. 
See Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 
BERKELEY J. GENDER, LAW & JUST. 64 (2012) (arguing that chivalry may explain various disparities in death 
sentencing). 
 34. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 45–48. 
 35. Id. at 44–46. 
 36. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES 5, 120 (2014); Austin Sarat, What Botched Executions Tell Us 
About the Death Penalty, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 27, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/04/27/what-
botched-executions-tell-about-death-penalty/n857QsoDKDLN7fdNB6fimO/story.html. 
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undercuts its retributive effect.37 
Two questions, alluded to by LaChance, might have been more fully addressed. 
First, LaChance tells a national story. His data about support for the death penalty are taken 
from national surveys, and his cultural evidence—from movies, television shows, books – 
is national in character. However, as noted above, the death penalty is very much a regional 
phenomenon.38 What explains Southerners’ enthusiasm for the death penalty? Far from 
being a post-Furman cultural phenomenon, the South’s support for the death penalty may 
be rooted in long-standing cultural differences between the South and other regions. The 
Civil War itself reflected a contest between, to use LaChance’s terms, the North’s belief 
in a government that could effect positive freedom and the South’s distinctive commitment 
to negative freedom.39 Second, support for the death penalty post-Furman has tended to 
track support for incarceration in general.40 During the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, as a result of lengthened sentences for many crimes, mandatory minimums, and 
“three strikes” laws, the prison population in the United States exploded, but, recently, that 
trend has been reversed.41 Was the rise in support for the death penalty after Furman, and 
particularly its decline post-2000, simply a manifestation of a more general attitudinal 
change with regard to punishment, rather than the death penalty-specific issues that are 
LaChance’s focus? 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
Courting Death, the Steikers’ history of the modern death penalty, is the story of the 
Supreme Court’s failed attempt to regulate the states’ administration of capital 
punishment—its failure to find a tenable middle position between according the states the 
virtual free rein they enjoyed pre-Furman and striking down the death penalty as 
unconstitutional. The Steikers begin with the history of the death penalty before 1972 and 
emphasize, as LaChance does not, the regional disparities in its administration, disparities 
which continued into the post-Furman era. Drawing on earlier works,42 the Steikers 
describe how the death penalty evolved from the lynch mobs who took more than 3000 
lives in the South—mostly African-American men—in the period 1880-1930.43 In fact, 
many death penalty supporters in the first half of the twentieth century argued the need for 
a “legal” death penalty to avert lynchings.44 The Supreme Court itself was afraid of lynch 
                                                          
 37. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 188. 
 38. LaChance acknowledges that regional variations impose significant limitations on the use of nationally 
circulating ideas to explain the death penalty. Id. at 21. 
 39. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 866 (2d ed. 2003). 
 40. LaChance refers to this phenomenon as the “retributive revolution.” EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 
13, at 12. 
 41. SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections. 
 42. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 66 (2003). See 
also FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
 43. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 22–23. The Steikers’ estimate of the number of lynching victims is 
on the low end. Professor Zimring puts the number of lynchings in the period 1882–1968 at 4743. ZIMRING, 
supra note 42, at 90. The Equal Justice Initiative identifies 4084 “racial terror” lynchings in the twelve Southern 
states during the period 1877–1950. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE 
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2015), available at https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report. 
 44. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 23. 
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mobs. The Steikers tell the story of Ed Johnson, a Black man, who, in 1906, was convicted 
of rape (on very flimsy evidence) and sentenced to death by an all-White Tennessee jury.45 
When Justice Harlan, as circuit judge, accepted review of the case, a mob took Johnson 
from his cell and shot and lynched him, and a deputy sheriff pinned a note to his body, 
saying: “To Justice Harlan. Come get your nigger now.”46 This fear of lynch mobs led the 
Supreme Court to avoid taking up the issue of the death penalty until the wave of lynchings 
subsided.47 When the Court, responding to the litigation campaign undertaken by the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”), finally did begin to examine the death penalty in 
the 1960s, the death penalty seemed to be on its way out.48 In the Steikers’ view, the Court 
might have successfully abolished the death penalty if it had acted several years earlier, 
before President Nixon’s four appointments to the Court (all of whom dissented in 
Furman) and before his successful politicization of criminal justice issues that fueled the 
backlash to Furman.49 
When the Supreme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman, there 
was no majority opinion, and each of the five justices in the majority wrote his own 
opinion. The opinions of Justices Stewart and White—both finding an unconstitutional 
risk of arbitrariness in the infrequent application of the death penalty—were later said to 
embody the holding of the Court.50 In subsequent cases, the Court sought to enforce 
Furman and limit the risk of arbitrariness with two requirements: (1) state legislatures had 
to “genuinely narrow” the death-eligible class;51 and (2) state courts had to engage in 
meaningful review of death cases to assure that, in any given case, the sentence was 
proportionate.52 With these requirements, the Supreme Court invited the states—through 
their legislatures and courts—to participate with the Court in rationalizing the death 
penalty by constraining the discretion of prosecutors and juries. Then, in Woodson v. North 
Carolina,53 and Lockett v. Ohio,54 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment required 
individual consideration of a defendant’s background and record and the circumstances of 
the crime (i.e., the defendant must be allowed to present, and the sentencer had to consider, 
mitigating evidence). And, in Gregg, although the Court refused to find the death penalty 
disproportionate, at least when imposed for intentional murder, it recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment barred disproportionate punishments and applied a two-part test for 
determining whether the death penalty would be proportionate to a particular crime: (1) 
whether the penalty comported with evolving standards of decency, and (2) whether, in 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 33. 
 46. Id. at 33–34. 
 47. Id. at 37. As late as 1976, lynching was still on the justices’ minds. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to 
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-
help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.”). 
 48. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 59–60 
 49. Id. at 74. 
 50. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188–89 (plurality opinion). 
 51. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 52. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991). 
 53. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 54. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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the Court’s view, it was excessive, that is, whether it served a penological purpose.55 Thus, 
in the decade following Furman, the Court articulated three constitutional principles for a 
constitutional death penalty scheme. The scheme had to: limit the risk of arbitrariness; 
require the sentencer to consider mitigating evidence; and impose the death penalty only 
where proportionate.56 
The Steikers’ comprehensive and critical review of the Supreme Court’s forty years 
of regulation of the death penalty covers all the significant court decisions. Their argument 
is that the Supreme Court’s infrequent and inconsistent enforcement of its Eighth 
Amendment principles, along with questionable decisions on more general criminal 
procedure issues, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, the use of peremptory 
challenges, evidentiary rules for scientific evidence, and right to counsel in state post-
conviction, has given the illusion of regulation without the substance. 
[T]he fact of minimal regulation … is filtered through time-consuming, expensive 
proceedings that ultimately do little to satisfy the concerns that led the Court to 
regulate this country’s death penalty practices in the first place. In short, the last 
four decades have produced a complicated regulatory apparatus that achieves 
extremely modest goals while maximizing political and legal discomfort.57 
Although the Steikers’ critique is wide-ranging, what stands out is the Supreme 
Court’s twin failures with regard to the very issues that prompted its intervention in 
Furman: its failure to enforce its Furman requirements limiting the discretion of 
prosecutors and juries and its failure to address racial disparities in the administration of 
the death penalty. Although the Court has never deviated from its holding that Furman 
requires the states, by statute, to narrow the death-eligible class, it has also never, since 
Gregg, examined a single state scheme to see whether the state’s death eligibility factors 
collectively effected any meaningful narrowing. That failure to police its core holding had 
the predictable result that the states simply ignored the requirement in drafting and 
redrafting statutes and that, over time, there was “aggravator creep,” as the states steadily 
broadened their definitions of death eligibility with additional aggravators.58 In Furman, 
the Court found that the then fifteen to twenty percent death sentence rate made death 
sentences so infrequent as to create an unconstitutional risk of arbitrariness.59 Today, 
                                                          
 55. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172–73. 
 56. The Steikers suggest that the Court adopted a fourth Eighth Amendment principle in Woodson: the need 
for “heightened reliability” in capital sentencing. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 168–72. Although the 
Steikers cite a handful of cases where the Court referred to the concept, in fact, there seem to be only two cases 
where the Court arguably used such an Eighth Amendment principle to overturn a death sentence. See Johnson 
v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584–85 (1988); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637–38 (1980). The Steikers 
themselves point out a number of examples where the Court refused to apply such a principle, and they conclude: 
“In the post-Furman regime, the doctrine of heightened reliability, like the death penalty itself, seems to strike 
like lightning, randomly and with no broad effect.” COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 176. 
 57. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 176. 
 58. Id. at 161. 
 59. Although there was conflicting data before the Court as to the exact death sentence rate at the time, the 
Chief Justice, writing for the four dissenters, used the fifteen to twenty percent figure, as did Justice Stewart in 
his separate opinion. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 n.1 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 309 & 
n.10 (Stewart, J., concurring). In Gregg, the plurality relied on the same estimate. 428 U.S. at 182 n.26. Post-
Furman research determined that the pre-Furman death sentence rate in Georgia was fifteen percent. See DAVID 
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 80 (1990). 
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studies in various states have calculated a death sentence rate among death-eligible 
defendants to be well below that threshold.60 Far from limiting the death penalty to the 
“worst of the worst,” the states have chosen to make the overwhelming majority of 
murderers death-eligible. The Court’s other Furman requirement—that the state courts 
engage in meaningful review of death sentences—has had a similar fate. After Gregg, 
many states copied the Georgia scheme and required intercase proportionality review of 
death sentences, and state courts in a number of states set aside death sentences as 
disproportionate.61 Then, in Pulley v. Harris, the Court held that the mandated 
“meaningful appellate review” did not have to be intercase proportionality review.62 The 
states took the hint that the Court was not serious about proportionality review and most 
effectively abandoned it.63 The Supreme Court, only once, more than twenty-five years 
ago, intervened to enforce its meaningful appellate review requirement.64 
The failure of the Supreme Court to enforce its statutory narrowing and appellate 
review requirements has left prosecutors with virtually unfettered discretion to seek death 
and jurors with virtually unfettered discretion to impose it. As a result, there are wide 
variations in states’ administration of the death penalty and consequent wide variations in 
the states’ execution rates, those variations being determined by political, institutional, and 
legal culture of the particular state.65 The Steikers divide the states into four categories: 
(1) states without a death penalty, “abolitionist states” (nineteen states at the time of this 
writing); (2) states with a death penalty on the books, but with a trivial number of death 
sentences and executions, “de facto abolitionist states”; (3) states with significant numbers 
of death sentences, but few executions, “symbolic states”; and (4) states with frequent 
executions.66 Using California and Texas as examples, the Steikers explore the differences 
between symbolic and execution states, identifying a number of factors leading to 
California’s much lower execution rate, including the greater commitment to providing 
competent counsel, the much slower processing of cases by the California Supreme Court, 
the Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate (which has been much higher than that of the Fifth 
Circuit), and a “blue state” political climate and “due process” legal culture.67 The Steikers 
                                                          
Given the Court’s reliance on this estimate, the Steikers’ recommendation to limit death-eligibility is mystifying. 
They say if statutory aggravators in a given jurisdiction collectively apply to no more than 10% or 15% of 
murders, it is much more tolerable to have death sentences in only 1% or so of murders overall. COURTING 
DEATH, supra note 15, at 177. Under the Steikers’ scenario, 1 in 10 or 1 in 15 death-eligible murderers would be 
sentenced to death, roughly 7–10%. They do not explain why a 7–10% death sentence rate would be “tolerable” 
when the Supreme Court found a 15–20% death sentence rate made death so infrequent as to create an 
unconstitutional risk of arbitrariness. 
 60. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Sam Kamin, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are 
Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1112 (2013) (death sentence rate in Colorado of 0.56%); Shatz & Shatz, 
supra note 33, at 93 (death sentence rate in California of 5.5%). 
 61. See Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 
COLO. L. REV. 813, 845 n.170 (1999). 
 62. 465 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1984). It has been argued that proportionality review without comparison of like 
cases is an oxymoron. See White, supra note 61, at 834–35 (“To truly determine proportionality, a sentence must 
be viewed in light of other sentences; in other words, it must be compared.”). 
 63. White, supra note 61, at 847–49. 
 64. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). 
 65. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 144–49. 
 66. Id. at 118. 
 67. Id. at 119–53. 
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adopt Frank Zimring’s explanation of the basic problem: “A nation can have full and fair 
criminal procedures, or it can have a regularly functioning process of executing prisoners; 
but the evidence suggests it cannot have both.”68 The substantial variation among states 
may be dwarfed by enormous geographic disparities within states because each county 
prosecutor is free to determine how often to seek death.69 Thus, two percent of the counties 
in the country have produced the majority of executions post-Furman.70 LaChance makes 
the same point with his descriptions of Johnny Holmes, district attorney of Harris County, 
Texas (1980–1999) and Bob Macy, district attorney of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma 
(1980–2001).71 These two counties rank first and second, respectively, in executions since 
Furman.72 Both Holmes and Macy were highly popular, larger-than-life lawmen who 
embodied frontier masculinity with their string ties and handlebar mustaches and whose 
vigorous pursuit of the death penalty set them against a technocratic bureaucracy and a 
due process judiciary.73 With the states free to adopt overbroad definitions of death-
eligibility, with no check on prosecutors’ and jurors’ discretion, and with county 
prosecutors free to effect their own personal notions of frontier justice, the death penalty 
today appears to be no less arbitrary than the death penalty the justices addressed in 
Furman. 
As to the Supreme Court’s other fundamental failure, the Steikers argue that 
underlying the Court’s failed regulation of the death penalty was its refusal to address the 
“original sin” of racism.74 In the 1960s, LDF, believing that capital punishment generally, 
and for the crime of rape in particular, was applied in a racially discriminatory fashion, 
decided to challenge the death penalty with a litigation strategy that eventually produced 
Furman.75 Nonetheless, in the cases leading up to Furman, the Court said nothing about 
the race issue, and, in Furman itself, the majority justices, except for Justice Douglas, had 
little to say about race, even though Furman and the defendants in the two cases decided 
with Furman were Black men sentenced to death in the South. Justice Powell’s opinion 
for the four dissenters actually had the most to say about race. Foreshadowing his opinion 
for the Court fifteen years later in McCleskey v. Kemp, he dismissed the likelihood of racial 
discrimination with the assurance that “the possibility of racial bias . . . has diminished in 
recent years” and “discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far less likely today 
than in the past.”76 Most striking was the Court’s decision five years later in Coker v. 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 148. The Steikers conclude their comparison by asking why a “bizarre” death penalty regime like 
California’s—one that, at great cost, has produced many death sentences, but few executions—has survived, and 
they offer the provocative suggestion that symbolism is the point; California may “reap much of the benefit of 
the death penalty without actually having to kill.” Id. at 153 (quoting STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: 
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 62 (2002)). 
 69. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 185. 
 70. RICHARD C. DIETER, DPIC, THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY OF COUNTIES PRODUCE MOST 
DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS COSTS TO ALL (2013), available at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/twopercent. 
 71. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 130–54. 
 72. DIETER, supra note 70. 
 73. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 139. 
 74. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 3. 
 75. Id. at 40–56. 
 76. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 450 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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Georgia, where the Court held unconstitutional the death penalty for rape.77 The evidence 
of racial discrimination in rape sentencing was overwhelming. From 1930 until the 
decision in Furman, 455 men were executed for rape in the United States, and almost 
ninety percent of them were Black, and all of the 455 were executed for raping White 
women.78 Nonetheless, in Coker, the Court accepted a case where the defendant was 
White, and none of the opinions in the case mentioned the race issue. The Steikers suggest 
that the Court’s race-neutral approach was appealing for several reasons: the Court had its 
hands full dealing with the fallout from Brown v. Board of Education79 and did not want 
to tackle racism on another front; the Court was afraid of a similar backlash, especially 
because the death penalty was so popular in the South; crime rates were rising; and there 
was no good empirical evidence on race and the death penalty.80 
In 1987, the Supreme Court finally addressed the race issue in McCleskey v. Kemp,81 
the most important post-Furman death penalty case. There, McCleskey, an African-
American sentenced to death for the murder of a White police officer, presented a 
sophisticated empirical study of Georgia homicide prosecutions conducted by David 
Baldus and his colleagues demonstrating statistically significant racial disparities in the 
administration of the Georgia death penalty. The study found that, other factors being 
equal, Blacks were more likely to be sentenced to death than Whites, and, even more 
strikingly, defendants charged with killing White victims were 4.3 times as likely to be 
sentenced to death as those charged with killing Blacks.82 Based on these disparities, 
McCleskey challenged his death sentence as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
and as a violation of the Eighth Amendment (invoking Furman). The Court assumed the 
study’s findings were valid, but, in a five to four decision, ruled against McCleskey, 
finding that he failed to prove an equal protection violation because the study did not 
demonstrate intentional discrimination by any actor in the criminal justice system and 
finding that his proof of racial disparities did not amount to proof of a substantial enough 
risk of arbitrariness to violate the Eighth Amendment. The Steikers offer a number of 
reasons for the Court’s rejection of McCleskey’s claim: the belief that times had changed, 
and racism was no longer a major problem; the Court’s preference for addressing process 
issues rather than outcomes;83 the reluctance to base constitutional decisions on statistical 
evidence (Justice Powell, in a memo, admitted he did not understand the regression 
analysis used in the study);84 and a concern about future capital and non-capital cases and 
the courts’ ability to fashion a remedy.85 Could the Court have ruled otherwise and taken 
on the issue of racism and the death penalty? After the decision, Professor Baldus and his 
colleagues argued that there were at least three approaches, short of abolition, the Court 
                                                          
 77. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 78. STEVEN F. SHATZ, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 735 (3d ed. 2011). 
 79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 80. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 98–102. 
 81. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 82. Id. at 287. 
 83. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 104–08. “[T]he Court is often better suited to address the risk of evil 
than evil itself.” Id. at 241. 
 84. Id. at 102. 
 85. Id. at 108–09. 
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could have taken: (1) requiring the states to narrow the class of death-eligible cases;86 (2) 
requiring standards to limit prosecutorial discretion; or (3) recognizing claims of 
discrimination in individual cases based on proof similar to that used in other areas of the 
law.87 The Steikers disagree, arguing, “[t]he widespread influence of race on capital 
sentencing is not amenable to constitutional regulation short of abolition . . . .”88 
After setting out their critique of the Supreme Court’s death penalty record, the 
Steikers contextualize the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence with useful comparisons to 
other recent and problematic regulatory attempts by the Court.89 They cite Roe v. Wade90 
as another example of a bold decision by the Court being crippled by the popular 
“backlash.” There was no majority in the country for abolition of the death penalty or for 
abortion on demand, so Republicans were able to successfully politicize both issues in the 
pursuit of their Southern Strategy to woo away voters from the Democratic Party.91 The 
Steikers compare Furman with the Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution,” 
arguing that, in both contexts, the Court’s subsequent cases gave the illusion of regulation 
without the substance, thereby “legitimating” practices that should have been 
condemned.92 The Steikers analogize the Court’s attempt to deal with arbitrariness and 
racism in the death penalty with its treatment of gerrymandering after Baker v. Carr held 
that electoral districting had to be done on an equipopulous basis.93 In both instances, the 
Court neglected the issue for a century, intervened, and then retreated in the face of 
remedial constraints.94 As the Steikers point out, the Court was better equipped to order 
procedural reforms—“one person, one vote” in the case of voting rights, statutory 
narrowing and appellate review in the case of the death penalty—than it was to police 
substantive outcomes—political gerrymandering and racial disparities in the death 
penalty.95 Lastly, the Steikers see the Court’s death penalty cases as having a “discourse 
shaping” pattern similar to that of the same-sex marriage cases, where, in both instances, 
the Court’s decisions moved the debate from moral to utilitarian grounds.96 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 
What explains the declining support for, and use of, the death penalty post-2000, and 
what does that say about the death penalty’s future? For the most part, the authors agree 
on the reasons for the death penalty’s recent decline.97 Crime rates have declined, and, 
                                                          
 86. The Baldus study itself found that, in the most aggravated cases, “the race effects go away.” McCleskey, 
481 U.S. at 287 n.5 (1987). 
 87. David Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles Pulaski, Jr., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial 
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 362 n.7 (1994). 
 88. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 182. 
 89. Id. at 217–54. 
 90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 91. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 226. 
 92. Id. at 230. 
 93. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 94. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 242–46. 
 95. Id. at 241. 
 96. Id. at 246–54. 
 97. See EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 184; COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 193–95. 
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consequently, criminal justice has ceased to be a wedge political issue. The Supreme 
Court’s half-regulation of the death penalty has produced complexity and uncertainty in 
death penalty prosecutions and appeals, raising costs and delaying executions. At the state 
level, study after study has shown that executing a convicted murderer is far more costly 
than imprisoning him for life, and at the local level, the expenses associated with capital 
trials have priced many counties out of the death business. The average delay from 
sentence to execution has continued to rise—now more than twelve years nationwide, with 
far longer delays in some states—robbing executions of much of their impact when they 
eventually occur. In recent years, some states, which had not previously done so, have 
authorized life without parole sentences, and, given an alternative guaranteeing that the 
defendant will not be released, many prosecutors and jurors have rejected the death 
penalty. Lastly, the number of recent exonerations of death row defendants, many as a 
result of DNA testing, has resulted in increased caution about the use of the death penalty. 
Both books finish with speculations about the future of the American death penalty. 
LaChance and the Steikers published their books before the 2016 election, an election 
which arguably upended all earlier predictions. LaChance’s speculations appear in the last 
chapter of Executing Freedom, appropriately titled “Epilogue,” because it apparently was 
written separately from the rest of the book, as an expanded version of a 2014 op-ed piece 
in the New York Times.98 He argues that abolition will occur, not because of some moral 
awakening or because of exonerations, botched executions or evidence of racial 
disparities, but only when supporters recognize “that capital punishment cannot be made 
to live up to its retributive promise.”99 To that end, he urges abolitionists to shift their 
focus to victims with the message that the death penalty is just “another failed government 
program” doing more harm than good.100 Interestingly, as LaChance points out, the failure 
of the death penalty to satisfy supporters’ desire for “righteous violence” may be 
responsible, in part, for the recent passage of expanded self-defense statutes in twenty-two 
states.101 As to whether abolition will occur, LaChance seems ambivalent: “The 
conditions that make it increasingly difficult for the death penalty to generate retributive 
meaning have existed for years, and it is unclear whether they can, on their own, erode 
support for capital punishment.”102 
Unlike LaChance, the Steikers, in Chapter Eight of Courting Death, offer a clear 
prediction about how abolition will occur.103 In their view abolition does not depend on 
changing the cultural values supporting the death penalty because it will be accomplished 
by the Supreme Court, not the legislatures.104 Their blueprint for abolition predicts that 
the Court will utilize its “capacious” proportionality jurisprudence, rather than reviving 
                                                          
 98. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at xiii. 
 99. Id. at 185. 
 100. Id. at 191. This suggestion is consistent with the Steikers’ point that the death penalty discourse has 
shifted from moral to utilitarian grounds. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 101. EXECUTING FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 180. 
 102. Id. at 189. 
 103. They follow up their prediction regarding the end of the death penalty with a last chapter, Life After Death, 
which, in the guise of discussing how the criminal justice system will benefit from the predicted abolition, revisits 
the policy arguments against the death penalty. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 290–322. 
 104. Id. at 255–59. 
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Furman (risk of arbitrariness), reversing McCleskey (racial disparities) or, as some lower 
courts have done, finding other aspects of the death penalty—the risk of executing 
innocent persons105 or the inordinate delays in executions106—unconstitutional.107 The 
Steikers are right that only a ruling finding the death penalty disproportionate for all crimes 
will result in abolition. Even if the Court were to issue a favorable ruling on one of the 
other grounds mentioned (which the Court has shown no inclination to do), such a ruling 
would not invalidate the death penalty, but, like Furman, would require the states to go 
back and retool their death penalty schemes for another round of litigation. Is there really 
any likelihood that the Court will reverse its decision in Gregg and find the death penalty 
disproportionate?108 The Steikers make the case that the death penalty no longer comports 
with contemporary standards by pointing to the number of states that are abolitionist or de 
facto abolitionist (thirty), the significant decline in death verdicts and executions, 
moratoria imposed in several states by their governors, the concentration of the death 
verdicts in just a few jurisdictions, and the extraordinarily low death sentence rate among 
death-eligible murderers.109 And the Steikers suggest that the Court could look to the 
number of exonerations, the arbitrariness of death sentences, and the execution delays to 
conclude that the death penalty serves no penological purpose.110 
While such a decision is of course possible, it seems fairly unlikely. For the Court 
to determine that the death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards, when 
thirty-one states still have the death penalty on their books, risks the same misreading of 
public opinion as occurred in Furman. Further, the results of the 2016 elections seem to 
refute any argument that there is a trend toward abolition. Not only did the voters elect 
Donald Trump, a long-time death penalty enthusiast, to the presidency,111 but, at the same 
time, Nebraska voters overturned the legislative repeal of their death penalty,112 and 
California voters rejected an initiative to abolish the death penalty in favor of an initiative 
to speed up executions.113 Nor has the Court has given any indication that it would 
                                                          
 105. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 106. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 
538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 107. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 271–75. 
 108. The Steikers qualify their expectation that the Court will declare the death penalty unconstitutional 
“within the next decade or two” with the statement that such an outcome will depend on the appointment of 
liberal justices. Id. at 289. 
 109. Id. at 118. This last point actually argues for the Court holding the death penalty unconstitutional on the 
very ground used in Furman, risk of arbitrariness. 
 110. Id. at 284. 
 111. Trump once spent $85,000 to place full-page ads in the four New York papers calling for the return of 
the death penalty. Sarah Burns, Why Trump Doubled Down on the Central Park Five, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/opinion/why-trump-doubled-down-on-the-central-park-five.html. 
He has also put forward two currently unconstitutional proposals to expand the death penalty. First, a mandatory 
death penalty for killing a police officer. See World News Today, Trump Tells Police Group Every Cop Killer 
Gets Death Penalty If I Win, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvg9kc9uxc. 
Second, a mandatory death penalty for all pedophiles. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 
2012, 6:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/255294883680632833. 
 112. Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify Historic 2015 Vote 
by Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.omaha.com/news/politics/nebraskans-
vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penalty-nullify-historic-vote/article_38823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-
d7a71d75611a.html. 
 113. Jazmine Ulloa, Analysis: State’s Death Penalty Isn’t Going Away, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), 
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consider such a bold move. Despite the Court’s declaration in its more recent 
proportionality cases that the death penalty can only be imposed on “offenders who 
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’”114 and not on the “average 
murderer,”115 the Court has not used its “capacious” proportionality jurisprudence for the 
modest end of weeding out some of those average murderers now made death-eligible, 
such as the non-killing accomplice who had no intent to kill116 or the felony-murderer who 
killed negligently or accidentally.117 
If both scenarios for ending the death penalty discussed by the authors—popular 
rejection based on a realization that the penalty is not serving its retributive purpose or 
abolition by the Supreme Court—seem improbable, is there a path to abolition? Perhaps, 
but it will likely require a combination of factors, cultural and political as well as judicial, 
to bring about that result.118 If the Court continues to engage with the death penalty, its 
half-regulation will inevitably produce, in the Steikers’ words, “destabilizing 
consequences.”119 That may cause the “de facto abolitionist states” and the “symbolic 
states” finally to formally abandon the death penalty, not because of popular rejection, but 
for the same reasons that are now at work reversing mass incarceration policies: the 
symbolic value of harsh punishment is simply not worth the cost. And, if enough of those 
states take themselves out of the game, leaving just the hard-core execution states, a tipping 
point may be reached, allowing the Court to finally deliver the coup de grace. 
 
                                                          
http://www.readingeagle.com/ap/article/analysis-californias-death-penalty-battle-isnt-going-away. 
 114. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)). 
 115. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 116. See Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A Categorical Approach to 
Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371 (2011) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment bars the death 
penalty for defendants who neither killed nor intended to kill). 
 117. See Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment of Unintended Felony 
Murder, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141 (2017) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for 
defendants who kill with less than the mental state of reckless indifference to human life). 
 118. It is not inconceivable that the Court might choose to revisit one of the two core issues – arbitrariness or 
racism. It might decide that a given state’s scheme is unconstitutional under its “narrowing” or “appellate review” 
principles, or it might qualify McCleskey by permitting challenges to the death penalty in a given jurisdiction 
based on demonstrable racial disparities. However, while the Court’s reengagement with these core issues would 
be welcome, as noted above, the remedy in either area is not likely to be total abolition. 
 119. COURTING DEATH, supra note 15, at 204. 
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